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Abstract: Intra-household models have achieved significant theoretical development and 
received considerable empirical support within the past decade. This paper is a 
comprehensive and updated survey on three most influential categories of intra-
household models: the Nash cooperative bargaining settings, the collective settings, and 
the non-cooperative settings. Various models and the latest development within each 
category are discussed, along with corresponding testable restrictions and limitations. 
Dynamic cooperative bargaining models and endogenous collective models are 
introduced as the latest efforts in incorporating a richer set of elements to the intra-
household theory. The latest empirical results are summarized along with their policy 
implications. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In neo-classical family economics, the household is the unit of study. The 
household’s problem is to maximize a single utility function subject to a household 
budget constraint. Allocation is carried out such that the marginal utility of consumption 
is equalized across family members. Analogously, a decision on household production is 
an income maximization problem: Investment is made till the marginal rate of return 
equals the marginal cost, when there is no credit constraint. However, it is the welfare of 
individuals that should be the fundamental concern. Earlier unitary household models had 
to reconcile the single utility framework with the presence of multiple individuals. To do 
so unitary household models assume that family members’ utility functions can be 
systematically aggregated, that individual budget constraints can be combined, and that 
household production can be unified. To make such aggregations household members are 
either assumed to have homogenous preferences, or have an altruistic household head 
that has all the power within the household (Becker, 1981). When altruism is assumed the 
household maximizes the altruist’s utility function, which “cares” for all the family 
members, subject to full household income. In the altruistic household, individual welfare 
is decided by two factors: how far out the family budget constraint can be pushed, and 
how much the altruist values each beneficiary’s welfare (McElroy, 1997). With the 
unitary approach, who earns the income should not matter to household consumption 
patterns. In other words, income is “pooled”. 
Still, much can be learned regarding intra-household allocations with 
straightforward extensions to the neoclassical household production model with unified 
preferences (Strauss, et al, 2000). Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982) explain the difference 
in female and male infant survival probabilities in India on the ground of differential 
market rates of return to male and female. Pitt et al (1990) find that allocations of calories 
are more likely to reinforce disparities in health endowments for individuals in groups 
that have low incomes and engage in energy-intensive labor market activities. Behrman 
et al (1982) on the other hand, argue that both preferences and market opportunities 
operate to affect allocations.  
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Despite the achievements of varied versions of unitary household models, the 
assumption that family members have homogenous preferences or there is an altruist that 
decides everything within the household is not satisfactory. In addition, within the unitary 
approach, any unequal allocation of resources can be justified on efficiency grounds, 
which is extremely unappealing to the studies on discrimination and gender bias. Leaving 
resource allocation behavior to the black box of the family can lead to failure in targeting 
the population group of concern in policy and program design.  
The family is a place of conflict and cooperation. Empirical support for the 
existence of altruistic motives is not overwhelming. Indeed, some of the most influential 
studies have reached mixed conclusions, possibly favoring “exchange” rather than 
altruism as a motive for intra-family transfers (Anderberg & Balestrino, 2003). From the 
late 1970s, various intra-household bargaining models start to appear. Those models pay 
special attention to the interaction between heterogeneous preferences of household 
members and power distribution among household members. They have made substantial 
theoretical progress and gained considerable empirical support. Those models 
successfully explain phenomena that cannot be understood under the unitary framework 
and reshape policy designs to make social welfare and individual development programs 
more efficient. The implications of non-unitary household models also provide additional 
policy instruments. In the following sections I will first review three categories of intra-
household models: the Nash cooperative bargaining settings, the “collective” settings, 
and the non-cooperative settings, together with the latest theoretical developments in each 
category. Empirical testing problems and evidence will follow the theoretical reviews, 
and policy implications and the limitations of bargaining models will conclude this 
survey.  
 
 
2. Nash Bargaining Models 
 
Cooperative Nash bargaining household models is the earliest attempt to 
explicitly describe the decision-making process within household. In fact, as pointed out 
in Manser and Brown (1980), the altruist approach in Becker’s unitary model (1974, 
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1981) includes two assumptions: explicitly there is an altruist that maximizes his utility 
function subject to the family resource constraint; implicitly a bargaining rule is assumed 
for  the household to maximize the altruist’s utility function (Pollak, 1985). Similar to the 
unitary approach all cooperative bargaining models considered in the intra-household 
context yield optimal outcomes.  
 
The Basic Models 
 
The earliest papers that established the Nash bargaining approach to the 
household include Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981). The two 
papers complement each other, with the first one covering a larger scope than the second. 
The key features of the cooperative bargaining model are utility gain and “threat points”. 
A two-person household is considered in the game. Household consumption of goods is 
categorized into five types: public goods, wife’s private goods and leisure, and husband’s 
private goods and leisure. Therefore household members choose, correspondingly, 
),,,,( 0 MMFF lxlxx  subject to their respective prices. When the couple is married, some 
of the private consumption, like housing, that was afforded privately before marriage is 
shared as a public good. Before marriage, each person maximizes FMilxx ii ,),,,( 0 =  
subject to his or her respective budget constraints. Assuming the preferences are rational, 
monotonic, convex and continuous, the utility function is increasing and quasi-concave. 
The solution to this constrained maximization program can then be expressed in a well 
defined continuous and strictly quasi-convex, homogeneous of degree zero, indirect 
utility function FMiYpVV iiii ,),,( == , where p and Y are price and income.  
Once the couple is married, its utility maximization solution, subject to the 
household’s full income also includes the partner’s utility and consumption: )(xUU ii = . 
People choose to get married because of positive utility surplus within marriage as 
compared with utility obtainable when remaining single. In the bargaining framework, 
iV  serves as the “threat point” in the sense that, if utility within marriage is lower than 
this, the marriage would dissolve. The threat point serves as the reservation utility, which, 
in addition to price and individual income, also depends on the extrahousehold 
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environmental parameters (EEP). EEPs can include such factors as the male-female ratio 
in the marriage market, policies regarding marriage and divorce benefits as well as social 
and religious norms and traditions. Assuming marriages satisfy the symmetric property, 
McElroy and Horney (1981) focus on the following special Nash problem: 
)];,()([)];,()([max FFFFFMMMMM
x
YpVxUYpVxUN αα −⋅−=  
subject to the full income constraint. α  is the EEPs. The solution is confined by three 
properties: Pareto optimal outcomes, symmetry and invariance with respect to positive 
linear transformation of the utility functions.  
The scope of solution to a cooperative game is much broader. Manser and Brown 
(1980) propose three solutions to the cooperative game. First, without assuming 
symmetry, they consider an extreme case of dictatorial marriage where one partner 
determines the allocation. With the addition of symmetry assumption they consider a 
Nash bargaining solution and a Kalai and Smorodinsky solution.i Manser and Brown 
(1980) have shown that the Nash solution can be rewritten as: 
)]ln[)]max[ln(max FFMM
x
VUVUN −+−=  
Because the sum of two quasiconcave functions is not necessarily quasiconcave, a unique 
solution is not guaranteed without further assumptions for the Nash solution. On the other 
hand, the K-S solution yields a unique solution. In both cases the objective function is 
price-dependent, and they yield demand functions that are in general indistinguishable in 
terms of either the variables included or the general restrictions placed on them [Manser 
& Brown, p.40]. Other forms of the bargaining solution are also explored. For example, 
relaxing the symmetry property, Harsanyi and Selton (1972) develop a generalized Nash 
solution with incomplete information, and Dubra (1999) develops an asymmetric K-S 
solution. Some of these developments are applied to non-cooperative intrahousehold 
bargaining models. In addition, Rochford (1984) analyzes the implication for matching in 
the marriage market in a model characterized by Nash bargaining with transferable 
utility. 
 
Comparative Statics and Empirical Implications 
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To evaluate the income effect and the price effect in the Nash bargaining 
framework, McElroy and Horney (1981) focus on the Nash solution to the household 
utility maximization problem. In order to capture the additional effect that takes impact 
through the changes in the threat point utility, an Iso-gain Product Curves concept is 
developed to capture the fact that changes in prices and nonwage incomes not only twist 
and shift the budget constraint in the traditional way but also change the objective 
function itself (because the reservation utilities, as arguments of the Nash objective 
function, would be affected by prices, incomes, and additionally, the EEPs). The 
household utility curve is analogous to the preference curve in that it describes all 
possible female and male utility combinations given a fixed level of utility gain product. 
Two concepts are key to the understanding of the additional effect brought by Nash 
generalization. 1) The family rate of substitution of two goods is defined as the absolute 
value of the slope of the iso-gain product curves. The partial derivative iij pFRS ∂∂  tells 
us how the iso-gain product curve would tilt in response to a price change. 2)The MRS∆  
marginal family utility substitution is defined as the difference in the spouses’ individual 
marginal rates of substitution F
j
F
i
M
j
M
i
U
U
U
U
∂
∂−∂
∂ . Consider the MRS of male leisure (good i) 
in terms of female leisure (good j). When male MRS is greater than female MRS, it 
indicates the husband places a higher relative value on his own leisure in terms of his 
wife’s leisure than the wife does. MRS∆  tells us how the iso-gain product curve would 
tilt in response to an income change.  
The comparative statics is characterized by the Nash generalization of the 
substitution matrix. Several matrices are crucial in the new characterization: 
pX  has as its element the demand response to price changes; 
IX  has as its element the demand response to full income, male income and 
female income changes; 
αX  has as its element the demand response to changes in the EEPs; 
D  is a matrix that includes the impact of consumption level changes on male and 
female utility levels with marriage; 
 7
pV  has the elements describing the price effect on male and female reserve 
utilities; 
IV  has the elements describing the male and female income effect on male and 
female reserve utilities. 
λ  is the Lagrange multiplier that captures the marginal utility of full income as in 
the classic demand theory.  
Let S be the classic Slutsky matrix that has as its element the combination of price 
effect with compensated wealth effect. The Nash generalized Slutsky matrix is given by 
1−SG , where  
)'( 21
' lqVVDIG Ip ++= λ  
I is the identity matrix with 5 columns and 5 rows since there are five goods at issue. l is 
a vector of 1’s. It can be seen that the generalized Slutsky matrix is weighted by G, which 
captures the impact of income and of price changes on the threat points. The male’s and 
female’s income effects are weighted by the demand for the commodity whose price has 
changed. In the special case of unitary preferences, the demand responses to male and 
female income changes are the same, and income and price effects on the reservation 
utility are zeros. Then the generalized Slutsky matrix collapses into simply S. Therefore 
the Slutsky matrix that characterizes the unitary preferences is nested in its generalized 
form.ii McElroy and Horney (1981) and McElroy (1990) summarize four empirical 
implications derived from the generalization that can potentially be tested: 
a) Male income effect should not be different from female income effect on demand 
in the unitary model. However, they can differ in the Nash framework; 
b) EEPs should have no effect on demand in the unitary model, whereas they have 
effect in the Nash model; 
c) S is symmetric and negative semidefinite in the unitary framework. In the Nash 
model 1−SG  is symmetric and negative semidefinite.iii 
Considering a decomposition of total price effect on the demand bundle of male 
and female leisure is helpful to see the additional movements incurred by the generalized 
Nash framework. Graphically speaking, the Nash case is special in that a price change or 
an income change not only tilts the budget constraint curve, but also changes the slope of 
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the iso-gain product curves (the preference curves in the neoclassical case). Suppose the 
male wage rate rises and so the price for male leisure increases. 1) Neoclassical 
substitution effect: As in the neoclassical demand theory, the Hicksian wealth 
compensated effect keeps the original level of utility but chooses a different male and 
female leisure bundle. Graphically, the utility curve remains unchanged but the budget 
constraint twists and the new leisure bundle is the tangent point of the twisted line 
(compensated for wealth change) and the old utility curve. 2) Iso-gain product curve 
price tilt effect: Since a price change in the Nash framework not only changes the budget 
constraint but also changes the objective function itself, the iso-gain product curve also 
twists. The twist is based on the sign of iij pFRS ∂∂ . The old and new curves intersect 
each other. The bundle obtained by step 1 is reevaluated with the tilted utility curve. A 
new bundle of leisure that generates the same level of utility according to the tilted utility 
curve is obtained at the minimal cost according to the tilted budget curve. 3) Neoclassical 
income effect: In this step the bundle from step 2 is pushed to the budget frontier that is 
realizable with the new male leisure price. This move corresponds to the neoclassical 
income effect. 4) Iso-gain product curve income tilt effect: Finally, because the new 
wealth level is achieved through male wage change, in the Nash framework, male income 
and female income have different effects and change the objective function through the 
shifts of the reservation utility terms. If for example the husband is selfish. Then the 
leisure bundle would shift in the direction favoring him. The curve tilt is given by the 
sign of MRS∆ . 
As is clear from the above example, the sum of step 1 and 3 gives the total price 
effect on demand in the unitary model. In the unitary case the movements in step 2 and 4 
would be non-existent. In the generalized Nash case the price effect is the sum of all four 
steps, with step 2 and 4 caused by the fact that price and income change affects the 
objective function itself. 
 
Difficulties with the Nash Household 
 
The generalized Nash framework has important empirical implications. However, 
those implications are not immediately testable with observable data. Researchers have 
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realized the difficulties with the Nash bargaining household models from the perspective 
of empirical testing.  
First, Chiappori (1988b) finds an error in the McElroy and Horney’s derivation of 
the weight matrix G in the generalized Slutsky matrix (see note 2). But more 
fundamentally, Chiappori argues that nothing can be said about the properties of the 
generalized Slutsky matrix. This is because there is no reason to assume that the threat 
utility functions are observable. And if those are not observable, no explicit restrictions 
can be put on the weight matrix G, which is the key that differentiates the Nash properties 
from the unitary properties. Some of the hypotheses under unitary assumption are not 
difficult to test. However, rejecting the properties of the unitary model does not by itself 
prove the Nash bargaining model is correct (Chiappori, 1988b; McElroy, 1990). Failure 
to reject the property hypotheses under the Nash framework can lend support to single 
out the Nash model as the more appropriate one. Yet Chiappori’s argument shows the 
comparative statics of the generalized demand system is not empirically differentiable 
from those from the unitary system. 
Second, in McElroy and Horney’s model, the married and unmarried utilities are 
assumed to be independent from each other. Combined with the first difficulty, Chiappori 
(1988b, 1991) argues that Nash bargaining does not imply anything more than Pareto 
efficiency. Based on this observation, Chiappori and other researchers have developed a 
different approach to household decision-making, namely the “collective” approach that 
will be surveyed in the next section. The “collective” approach has successfully produced 
theoretical and empirical results even though the approach only assumes Pareto 
efficiency and nothing about the decision-making process itself.  
In McElroy and Horney’s reply (1990) to Chiappori’s charges as well as in 
McElroy (1990), the authors propose a scheme to estimate the reservation utilities from a 
sample of divorced men and women. Considering the very likely sample selection 
problem whereby the divorced population and the married population might have 
unobserved characteristics that correlate with variables included in the utility function, 
they suggest the use of standard econometric methods such as the Heckman’s 2SLS 
(1979) to correct for the problem. The authors argue that if threat points can be 
independently estimated, the Nash bargaining approach leads to testable restrictions upon 
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household behavior. However, Chiappori (1997) argues that the concept of Nash 
bargaining equilibrium requires a cardinal representation of preferences, which is not 
invariant through an increasing transformation of utilities, threat points, or both. At the 
same time, there are many preference representations that are compatible with the 
observed patterns of consumption. The conclusion will then crucially depend on the 
choice of preference forms.iv This weakness is largely an empirical one because most 
consumption and expenditure data are collected at the household level rather than the 
individual level (Doss, 1996). Therefore individual preferences are unobservable. In 
many empirical studies such as Thomas (1990) and Hoddinott and Haddad (1995), an 
inferential approach is applied to recover individual preferences by examining how 
expenditure pattern changes according to “who controls how much income”. Yet it is the 
combination of heterogeneous preferences and power that gives rise to the 
observationally different consumption patterns (Smith & Chavas, 1999). To solve the 
difficulty with inferred preferences, Kapteyn and Kooreman (1992), and Kusago and 
Barham (2001) use direct information on preference heterogeneity collected from 
interviews without assuming sample-wide preference differences between the genders.  
A fourth problem with the Nash cooperative bargaining framework is its choice of 
threat points. A “threat point” can correspond to divorce, to violence or the threat of 
violencev (Touchen, Witte & Long, 1991), or to a non-cooperative equilibrium within 
marriage (Ulph, 1988; Lundberg & Pollak, 1993). In the case where the threat point 
corresponds to divorce, although the married and divorce utility functions can be 
assumed to be unrelated and marriage state-dependent, in general cooperative bargaining 
models make the more restrictive assumption that utility is invariant across marital 
statuses (McElroy, 1990). Spouse’s consumption argument in the married utility function 
is suppressed to zero to generate the divorce utility function. There are two criticisms on 
this treatment. First, it is argued that the marriage utility and divorce utilities may not be 
comparable if utility depends directly on marriage (Strauss, et al, 2000). And second, as 
pointed out in McElroy (1990), the invariant utility restriction rules out some functional 
forms such as the Cobb-Douglas because with invariant utility function the divorce utility 
is always 0 with Cobb-Douglas. In addition, divorce incurs huge transaction cost. In a 
daily, repeated game of family cooperation and conflict, using divorce as a threat point is 
 11
not realistic. Divorce may be suitable as the fallback position for long run bargaining, 
while non-cooperative equilibrium might characterize short-term daily negotiating better. 
Even though non-cooperative equilibrium usually results in under-supply of public good, 
it is sustainable because of the transaction cost related with divorce. 
Another weakness of the cooperative framework is that the results of Nash 
bargaining are not self-enforcing; That is, cooperative models involve binding and 
enforceable agreements (Kusago & Barham, 2001). And it is also assumed that the 
agreements are enforceable costlessly. However, with a household, the ability to commit 
to a sharing agreement is limited (Ligon, 2003), and quite reasonably enforcing any parts 
of the agreement cannot be costless. The above difficulties with the cooperative 
bargaining framework give rise to theoretical development in two directions. The first 
three weaknesses lead to the “collective” approach to household bargaining where the 
only assumption is Pareto optimal outcome and nothing is assumed about the decision 
making process itself or anything about preferences. On the other hand, problems with 
choosing an appropriate threat point and with providing realistic schemes in which Nash-
bargained agreement is binding costlessly lead researchers to develop non-cooperative 
bargaining models. By contrast, non-cooperative models do not assume household 
members enter into binding and enforceable contracts. In other words, non-cooperative 
equilibrium is self-enforcing. The “collective” approach will be reviewed in the next 
section, and non-cooperative bargaining models will be surveyed in section 4. 
 
Recent Development in Cooperative-Bargaining Modeling: Dynamic Models 
 
The dynamic intra-household cooperative bargaining model is developed out of at 
least two considerations. First, we need to consider the fundamental motivation for 
household formation. Household production specialization (Becker, 1974b) and 
collective production of public goods (Lundberg & Pollak, 1996) are the traditional 
efficiency considerations for forming a family. However, consumption smoothing is 
another important reason for household formation (Ligon, 2003), especially in developing 
agricultural countries where income is subject to high uncertainty. Static models are 
insufficient to describe such production risks and consumption smoothing behavior. 
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Second, we also have to consider the motivations of intra-household transfer, whether it 
is between spouses or between generations. Although Becker, et al (1990) postulate 
altruism as the driving force, previous studies (for example, Altonji, Hayashi & Kotlikoff, 
1992, 1997; Cigno & Rosati, 1996; Cigno, Giannelli & Rosati, 1998; Lillard & Willis, 
1997) have reached mixed conclusions, possibly favoring “exchange” rather than 
altruism as a motive for intra-family transfers (Anderberg & Balestrino, 2003)vi. Since 
intra-household exchange involves efficient investments and “profit” sharing, how such 
“exchange” agreement is enforced becomes an important question of study. Earlier 
studies (for example, the cooperative models discussed above, and the overlapping-
generations models by Cremer, Kessler & Pestieau, 1992) either ignore the enforcement 
problem or assume the agreement is binding and costless. Later studies use such concepts 
as “separate spheres” (Lundberg & Pollak, 1993) and “family social capital” (Cigno, 
1993) to explain the informal binding mechanism that enforces the intra-household 
sharing agreement.  
Within the cooperative bargaining framework, Ligon (2003) develops a dynamic 
bargaining model to address the interactive nature and contract enforcement problems 
within household. Three features distinguish the dynamic model from the static 
bargaining models: No household member ever wants to terminate the marriage; 
Bargaining position adjusts over time and re-negotiation is ongoing; And negotiation 
results do not have to be always Pareto efficient. In the multi-period setting, negotiation 
in each period forms a sharing agreement. Such sharing rule produces ex post optimality 
because it is based on history of previous time periods. The allocation is not generally 
Pareto optimal ex ante, because of the lack of costless and binding enforcing 
mechanisms. Risk averse and forward looking household members negotiate on the basis 
of the entire sequence of power alternation instead of the relative power of one period. 
An ex post efficient sharing agreement that divides surplus between spouses is reached 
based on historical periods. Family members will efficiently divide any momentary 
surplus according to that invariant sharing rule until they reach a point such that 
continuing to use this rule would make one of the members worse off than if he or she 
becomes single (Ligon, 2003). At that point, household members re-negotiate the sharing 
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agreement between them and continue as before until they reach a state in which one of 
them would be better off by terminating the relationship.  
The dynamic bargaining model therefore can be characterized by two rules: the 
sharing rule, and a rule to update the sharing weights. Uncertainty and shocks can be 
easily included into the model. In a simulated example corresponding to stylized 
Bangladesh rural households, it is found that if one household member has higher 
unconditional surplus from marriage (for example, when the state of divorce is extremely 
unfavorable to women, wives would be more committed to the relationship), then the 
surplus for women will eventually depend only on the bargaining position of women 
when their bargaining power is the weakest (for example, when an adverse “shock” 
occurs and women’s crops experience a low yield year). Ligon concludes that the model 
explains why women borrowers from the Grameen bank voluntarily “pipeline” their 
loans to their husbands instead of using the loans for production. Choosing to give up the 
loans is less productive but also safer, avoiding uncertain shocks that can potentially put 
women in worse bargaining positions. Since at the same time women have more 
attachment to the family, the sharing rule depends on the state in which her bargaining 
power is constrained to its lowest level by the adverse shock. Ligon argues that although 
“pipelining” is an unexpected outcome of the Grameen bank small loan program, both 
equity and efficiency can be improved when husbands take most of the risk.  
Ligon’s dynamic bargaining model is encompassed in a broader array of inter-
temporal strategies. Imposed on the bargaining in each single period is a strategy 
allocating consumptions across periods. Lich-Tyler (2003) discusses a test among three 
inter-temporal strategies and further probes into the determinants of adopting specific 
strategies. Households may adopt a myopic procedure, a contractual procedure or a 
prescient procedure. In the myopic procedure household members solve the allocation 
problem in each period independently without considering past or future bargaining 
problems. In the contractual procedure the household makes an allocation decision for all 
periods simultaneously, viewing the entire lifetime as a single bargaining problem. The 
prescient procedure is an inter-temporal strategy somewhere between the first two 
strategies, and is similar to what is described in Ligon’s dynamic model. In terms of the 
bargaining threat point, the myopic procedure considers the instantaneous external 
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opportunities of a single period. The allocation decision changes according to the yearly 
change of the outside options. The contractual procedure considers the lifetime expected 
external opportunities instead of instantaneous threat points, and therefore bargaining 
outcomes are invariant to instantaneous change in bargaining power. The prescient 
procedure takes only the future extra-marital opportunities into consideration instead of 
the whole lifetime opportunities. Therefore newly married couples have more at stake 
than old couples. The closer to the beginning of lifetime of marriage, the closer the 
prescient and contractual outcomes are. It is argued that bargained household decisions 
are not invariant to the inter-temporal procedure. Inferring preferences based on observed 
household decisions of one single period is misleading if the inter-temporal strategy is 
not taken into account. The myopic and prescient procedures do not have to produce 
optimal results, while the contractual procedure produces optimal outcomes. However, 
without binding and enforceable agreements, the contractual procedure is hard to 
implement.  
Using bargaining outcomes depending on inter-temporal strategies, it is possible 
to use distinctive Euler equations to characterize the three procedures that embody 
testable restrictions. There is no dominant inter-temporal strategy across households. 
Using PSID 1976-1986 data, Lich-Tyler finds that married couples with children are 
more likely to adopt prescient strategy. The restrictions imposed by the prescient strategy 
are not rejected. The other two strategies are rejected at a confidence level as low as .5%. 
On the other hand, married couples without children predominantly adopt the myopic 
strategy. The results indicate that if a single period behavior is used for couples with 
children, we cannot properly infer spouse preference because agents are obviously saving 
or cutting back their preferred consumptions in anticipation of future contingencies.  
Empirical evidence also supports that, as we would expect intuitively, increased 
cost of divorcing would drive the household toward the prescient procedure. It is found 
that having children, stricter divorce laws, and older age lead the household to adopt the 
prescient strategy. The contractual procedure, though yielding efficient outcomes, is 
rarely adopted by households. 
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3. Collective Models 
 
With minimal assumptions, household models in the collective settings have seen 
a fast growth in the literature (for example, Chiappori, 1988a; Bourguignon, Browning, 
Chiappori & Lechene, 1993; Chiappori, 1997; Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori & 
Lechene, 1994; Browning & Chiappori, 1998; Basu, 2001; Koolwal & Ray, 2002; Maitra 
& Ray, 2003). These types of models are called collective household models, or 
sometimes, Pareto efficient models, due to the fact that they only make the minimal 
assumption that the outcomes of intra-household conflict and collaboration are Pareto 
efficient. Unlike the cooperative bargaining models, no household games or decision-
making mechanisms are specified. Like the cooperative bargaining model, the outcomes 
are efficient.  
 
Distinctions between the Collective and the Unitary Approach 
 
In the classical unitary approach, the household maximizes a single utility 
function subject to the income constraints. The key difficulty in justifying the unitary 
household approach is to reconcile the single-utility framework with the existence of 
multi individuals within the household. Restrictive assumptions have to be made to solve 
the problem. The traditional unitary approach to household decision making assumes 
either family members have the same preferences, or individual preferences can be 
aggregated into a household utility function (Chiappori, 1997). Examples of such 
aggregation includes the altruistic approach, where the household head cares about the 
welfare of each household member, and the dictatorial approach, where all other 
members’ preferences are subsumed by the household head’s own preference, with the 
household maximizing the head’s utility function subject to household income constraint. 
Samuelson’s household welfare index (1956) and Becker’s rotten kid theorem (1981) are 
probably the first two attempts to formally model and justify the unitary approach. The 
collective approach argues that the same preference assumption and the systematic 
aggregation assumption are not realisticvii. Empirical evidence has consistently rejected 
the unitary assumptions (for example, Thomas, 1990; Schultz, 1990; Johnson & Rogers, 
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1993; Quisumbing & Otsuka, 2001; Attanasio & Lechene, 2002). Indeed, “individualism 
is supposed to lie at the foundation of micro theory, and individualism obviously requires 
one to allow that different individuals may have different preferences” (Browning, 
Bourguignon, Chiappori & Lechene, 1994, p1068). A general approach should be 
developed to depict household decision making before special cases like the unitary 
models are tested. Keeping the assumption to the minimal, the greatest virtue of the 
collective approach is its generality.  
 
Even though the distinction between the unitary and the collective approach 
appears to be obvious, Chiappori (1997) specially points out two issues that are likely to 
be confusing. First, the fundamental discrepancy between the two approaches does not lie 
with the number of decision makers within the household. As pointed out above, 
Samuelson and Becker both recognize that there are multi preferences within the 
household. The unitary approach simply devises restrictive assumptions to simplify the 
analytical framework. In this sense, the unitary approach is nested within the collective 
approach. Second, the point of departure between the two approaches does not lie with 
the maximization of a unique welfare index. Rather, in the unitary models, the maximand 
can be interpreted as a utility function; it is independent of prices and incomes—the latter 
appearing only in the budget constraint (Chiappori, 1997). Once the total expenditure is 
controlled, income should not affect demand in the unitary model. In all collective 
models, on the other hand, one the most distinguished features is that the maximand is 
price-dependent. The household utility will depend on prices and income, and price and 
income enter the function only through the household “sharing rule” function, which will 
be discussed later.   
 
The Basic Model 
 
In the basic model a two-person household is considered for simplicity. Young 
children can be added into the model without changing the basic setup by assuming no 
decision-making power for the children. However, in the reality, older children also have 
the power to affect household decisions, which is a factor considered in Becker’s “rotten 
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kid” theorem. Household consumption is divided into public and private goods. House 
maintenance is an example of public good, and clothing is an example of private good. 
However, the distinction between the two types of goods is not always unambiguous. In 
fact, potentially a lot of the private goods have a public element if family members care 
about each other. The budget constraint can be presented as 
yQPqqp FM =++ ')('  
where y is the total household budget, p and P are vectors of prices for the private and 
public goods, and FMiqi ,, = are male and female private consumptions. Q denotes 
public expenditure within the household.  
The two-person household’s problem is to maximize the weighted utility function: 
FM UU )1( µµ −+  
where FMiU i ,, = represents husband and wife’s preferences, which is a function of 
),,( Qqq BA . µ is the weight attached to each member’s preference. Weights are between 
0 and 1, and they sum up to 1. µ  captures the household decision-making process and its 
result. Sometimes it is called the “distribution of power” index (Browning & Chiappori, 
1998). It can be seen that when FM UU = , or when µ equals 1 or zero, the collective 
collapses into a unitary model, with the latter case representing a dictatorial scheme of 
household decision making. Larger µ  makes the household utility represent more the 
husband’s preference than the wife’s.  
In the unitary model, µ  is exogenously given. In the collective model, as in all 
the bargaining models, µ  captures the decision process and is a function of prices, total 
household income and other variables such as income distribution and marriage market 
conditions. The outcome of the household decision process is postulated to be efficient. 
That is, for any price-income bundle, the consumption vector chosen by the household is 
such that no other vector in the budget set could make both members better off. Without 
further assumptions except for the typical ones such as U is strictly concave, continuous 
and increasing in FMiqi ,, = , and Q, and µ  is a differentiable and zero homogeneous 
function, we can derive testable implications from this very simple model. For example, 
after controlling for total expenditure, income source should not matter under the unitary 
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framework. No assumptions are needed for the nature of goods or the form of preferences 
(Bourguignon, Browning & Chiappori, 1994). 
 
The “Sharing Rule” Interpretation 
 
The “sharing rule” interpretation of the collective setting is the key to derive more 
structural implications from the model. “Sharing rule”, a term used to describe the 
division of total expenditure on nonpublic goods between the two partners, is due to 
Becker (1981) (Browning, et al., 1994). To use the sharing rule interpretation in the 
collective setting, the nature of goods and the form of preferences should be categorized. 
As in the basic model presented above, consumption goods within the household can be 
divided into public and private goods. However, the line between the two types of goods 
is not always clear, depending on the form of preference chosen. For example, if the 
preference is completely altruistic, every member’s private consumption enters his or her 
partner’s utility function. In such a setting, all private goods carry a public element. 
Private goods can further be categorized as exclusive and non-exclusive.viii For example, 
labor supply (or leisure) is an exclusive good. Among those non-exclusive goods, they 
are further divided into assignable and non-assignable goods. A nonexclusive good is 
assignable when each member’s consumption can be observed independently; otherwise 
it is non-assignable (Chiappori, 1997). Such a distinctios between the nature of goods is 
helpful in deriving testable restrictions from the sharing-rule model: The presence of an 
assignable good or a pair of exclusive goods increases the predictive power of the model. 
The form of preference structure is not independent from the categorization of 
goods. There are three preference structures as summarized in Browning, et al. (1994): 
altruistic preference, egotistic preference, and caring preference.  
Altruistic: ;,),,,( BAiQqqfU BAii ==  
Caring: ;,)),,(),,(( BAiQqvQqvfU BBAAii ==  
Egotistic: ;,),,( BAiQqvU iii ==  
The altruistic form is the most general structure, where private goods from the partner 
enter into each other’s utility function. At the other extreme, in the egotistic preference, 
each person only cares about his or her own private consumptions. The caring preference 
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structure, on the other hand, shows that one person cares about the partner’s private 
consumption insofar as such consumption affects the partner’s utility. In the caring 
structure the utility function is weakly separable (Strauss, et al. 2000) in that it is not the 
amount of specific goods that the partner consumes, but his or her utility achieved from 
the consumption that is of concern to the other party in the household.  
Altruist preferences encompass single-utility frameworks. This is not true for 
egoistic models since egoistic preferences exhibit a separable property between each 
member’s private consumption bundles. There are some different opinions on the 
relationship among the three types of preferences. Strauss et al (2000) argue that egoistic 
preference is nested within both the altruistic and caring structures. In contrast, Chiappori 
(1997) claims that caring preference is nested within the egoistic preference because 
caring preferences are a subset of the egoistic preference structure rather than the 
altruistic structure. Strauss et al’s argument is more appealing intuitively.  
In order to achieve identification in the sharing rule setting, Browning et al (1994) 
make four additional assumptions: i) some goods are non-public; ii) preferences are 
caring; iii) each member’s sub-utility function is separable with respect to nonpublic 
consumptions;ix  
)),((),( QquVQqv iii
ii =  
and iv) there is one assignable private good or a pair of exclusive private goods.  
The sharing rule interpretation of the collective model postulates that the 
allocation decisions can be seen as if they were generated by a two-stage procedure under 
the assumptions that preferences are caring and outcomes are efficient. In the first stage, 
decisions are made on the allocation of total household income to savings, public goods 
expenditure and private expenditure for each household member. In the second stage, 
individuals maximize their utility with the amount of expenditure allocated to them in the 
first stage. Let x be the total private expenditure, and FM xx ,  are husband’s and wife’s 
private expenditures. Then with separable caring preferences, in the second stage each 
member of the household maximizes his or her own sub-utility subject to the amount 
allocated: 
)(max ii qu subject to i
i xqp ='  for ., FMi =  
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The weight, or the “distribution of power” index µ , now can be characterized by 
the income-sharing rule that allocates total household income to each household member 
for private consumptions, conditional on savings and public spending decisions. In the 
sharing rule framework, µ  is embodied in how x is divided up into FM xx , . To see this, 
in the collective setting it is postulated that there exists a differentiable, zero-homogenous 
function ),( xpµ  such that, for any (p, x), the vectors ),,( Qqq BA  are solutions to the 
“household utility function” in the collective setting: 
xQqqptsQqqUxpQqqUxp BABABBAA
Qq
=++−+ )(..),,()],(1[),,(),(max
,
µµ  
With the sharing rule interpretation, this assumption is equivalent to saying that there 
exist FM xx ,  such that the sub-utility function of each household member is maximized. 
The existence of such a sharing rule is ensured given assumptions i-iii above and 
efficiency (Browning et al, 1994). As long as the preferences are caring or egoistic and 
outcomes are efficient, any collective allocation decision process can be interpreted by a 
sharing rule procedure. Conversely any arbitrarily chosen rule will generate efficient 
outcomes when preferences are egoistic or caring (Chiappori, 1997).x  
Now the household utility is a function of household consumption and the sharing 
rule µ . Since µ  depends on price and income, the sharing rule approach implies price-
dependent preferences. Price and income enter only through the sharing rule function µ . 
It is important to distinguish between “distribution factors” and “preference factors”. 
Distribution factors affect the demand of consumption only via the weight function µ , 
whereas preference factors shift preferences that are represented by individual utility 
functions. To derive testable restrictions, the key is to identify those factors that can 
safely be assumed to influence the decision process but not preferences (Browning, et al: 
1994). Such factors can include each member’s personal income, the sex ratios in 
marriage markets, family laws and social traditions. In short, those “extra-environmental 
parameters” (EEPs) (McElroy, 1990) can all be good candidates of distribution factors. 
 
Empirical Tests 
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Without making assumptions about the household decision making process, the 
sharing rule interpretation of the collective setting generates two sets of testable 
restrictions by simply assuming efficiency and describing decision making outcomes 
through a sharing rule function.xi The first type of test uses cross-section data and 
explores the income effects. The second type of test exploits price variations across 
regions and time periods to look at the price effects.  
 
A) Income Effects 
 
As each household member’s private income enters household demand through 
the sharing rule function µ , a straightforward test of the “income pooling” hypothesis. In 
the unitary model, after controlling for total income or total expenditure, source of 
personal income should not affect demand on private goods. The coefficient of husband 
and wife’s personal income should be 0 if the unitary model is correct. Although this test 
is straightforward, it suffers from two limitations. First, it can be used to reject the unitary 
model but can by no means prove the collective model is correct. Second, personal 
income is endogenous with consumption choices in that the amount of market labor to 
supply and the amount of consumption are decided simultaneously. Empirical studies 
have tried to use non-earned income to alleviate the endogeneity problem. However, it is 
admitted that even those incomes might be endogenous because they partially reveals 
previous labor choices. 
The sharing rule interpretation of the collective model implies more restrictions 
than income pooling. Because personal incomes affect demands only through µ ,  
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Because the right hand side of the above equation is independent of i and j, the 
implication is that the ratio of marginal income effects of male and female incomes on 
demand should be constant across goods. Such effects are decided by the impact of male 
female relative income on the distribution power within the household. The left hand side 
of the above equation is observable from data and so the right hand side ratio is 
econometrically identified. If we can observe more than one good, the testable restriction 
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of the collective model is that the ratio of the coefficients of male and female personal 
income variable is equal up to some random variation across demand functions. Any 
distributional factors other than private incomes can also be examined in such a way. If 
the unitary household model is correct, then the source of income should have the same 
effect on demands. Therefore it would be expected that the ratio in the above equation is 
unity. Two nested tests can be established. First we can test on efficiency, and second 
income pooling. Using French (Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori & Lechene, 1993) 
and Canadian (Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori & Lechene, 1994) data, the income 
pooling restriction is rejected while the efficiency restriction cannot be rejected. The pair 
of tests has more power to support the collective approach to household decision making 
than a single income-pooling test. 
From the above characterization, the relative influence of male and female 
attributes (income) on household allocation can be recovered. If additional information is 
available, that is, if we can observe an “assignable” good or a pair of “exclusive” goods, 
the sharing rule itself can be identified (Browning, et al. 1994; Deaton, 1997; Strauss, et 
al. 2000). For an assignable good,  
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We have two equations and two unknowns. Therefore, the relative change in power 
distribution as a response to male income and total income change can be estimated.xii 
Following Chiappori (1997), another pair of similar equations can be set up to examine 
the demand and power change in response to female income change. 
The advantage of the income effect test from the empirical perspective is that it 
requires only one set of cross-section data. No price variation is needed. As pointed out 
by Deaton (1997), even when time-series or panel data are available, the variation in 
relative prices is typically much less than variation in real incomes. Therefore the income 
effect test has more power and is easier to implement. The difficulty with the test, on the 
other hand, lies with the assumptions on the nature of goods and the selection of 
distribution factors that do not affect preferences. First, even with such goods as male and 
female clothing, assuming their “assignability” implies “that wives care only about their 
husband’s clothing insomuch as it contributes to the welfare of their husband (and vice 
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versa)” (Browning, et al. 1994), which is not very convincing. Second, the distribution 
factors and consumption choices might be endogenously decided. For example, if relative 
income is found to affect the sharing rule significantly, spouses will tend to choose to 
work more. Finally, different types or sources of income having different effects on 
demand does not instantly reject the unitary model, when such differential effect is 
caused by the fact that some income sources are more regular than others, and some 
income flows are better measured than others (Deaton, 1997). The problem with the 
regularity and the measurement of income is especially pronounced in agricultural 
developing countries. 
 
B) Price Effects 
 
A natural second restriction is to examine the price effect (or the substitution 
effect). Three most basic properties of the Slutsky matrix are negative semidefiniteness, 
S(p,w)p=0, and symmetry. The first two properties are implied when the Walrasian 
demand is homogenous of degree 0 and satisfies the Walras’ law, and when the weak 
axiomxiii is satisfied. The matrix is not necessarily symmetric until the demand is 
considered as generated by a preference maximization process. Empirical studies have 
rejected the symmetry assumption (for example, Browning and Meghir, 1991), but this 
result serves to reject the unitary model without lending much support for the collective 
household theory. The question is whether the properties of the Slutsky matrix in the 
unitary framework can be nested in a more generalized format. 
Although there are other earlier attempts to examine the intra-household 
implications on the Slutsky matrix (see a series of discussion and follow-up papers by 
Chiappori, 1988b, 1991; McElroy & Horney, 1990), the gap is filled by Browning and 
Chiappori (1998) eventually. Continuing effort along this line in the Nash bargaining 
framework is being made by Lechene and Preston (2000), though their research is not 
complete yet.  
Browning and Chiappori’s principal theoretical result is “SR1”; that is, in a two-
person household, the Pseudo-Slutsky matrix is the sum of a symmetric, negative 
semidefinite matrix and a matrix that has at most rank one. In the standard preference and 
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demand system, the Hicksian demand is a funtion of price p and utility u, which in turn is 
a function of price p and wealth Y.  
),(),(),(),( YpqYpqDYpqDuphD Ypp ⋅+=  
It can be seen that the price effect on demand when utility is kept constant has two 
components, one being the demand response to the price change and the other the 
demand response to wealth compensation. The Slutsky matrix is a function of price and 
income (wealth), S(p, Y). In the collective setting, the Hicksian demand of the household 
is also a function of µ , ).,,( µuphh =  The corresponding “Slutsky” matrix has the 
components that can be interpreted as the partial derivatives of demands with respect to 
prices, holding both household utility and the “distribution of power” index µ  constant. 
Therefore, the demand change in response to a price change includes a substitution effect 
with both utility and µ  kept constant, captured by a symmetric and negative semidefinite 
matrix, and an effect in response to the change in µ , captured by a matrix that has at 
most rank one in the collective setting.  
To empirically implement the generalized SR1 pseudo-Slutsky matrix, Browning 
and Chiappori resort to a new matrix M=S – S’.  M’=-M and therefore it is a so-called 
antisymmetric matrix. The testable proposition is given as: a) in the collective setting, M 
has rank 0 or 2; b) If M has rank 0, the unitary case cannot be ruled out; c) If the rank of 
M is more than 2, the collective model is rejected.xiv To run the SR1 test, the authors 
propose that information on at least 5 commodities is needed. 
Browning and Chiappori successfully applied these new hypotheses with respect 
to the price effect on a Canadian dataset. The unitary model is rejected whereas they 
cannot reject the collective model. The lack of empirical tests taking advantage of price 
variance reveals the limitation of the price effect approach: Price variance is very difficult 
to obtain, even with time-series or panel data. The lack of price variation reduces the 
power of the test. 
 
Endogenous Collective Household Model and Empirical Results 
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An important shortcoming of the “collective” approach is that it assumes the 
determinants of the power function are exogenous (Basu, 2001; Hoddinott & Adam, 
1998). Therefore, the power itself is exogenously given. Such an assumption is argued to 
be unrealistic. For example, one of the widely acknowledged determinants of within 
family power is the male/female earning power, which in turn is often captured by the 
prevailing market wage rate for male/female workers (for example, Bourguignon & 
Chiappori, 1994). Basu (2001) argued that what determines the relative bargaining power 
within household is not just the wage rate but what he/she actually earns. The real income 
of a spouse is affected by the amount of hours he/she works, which is obviously a 
deliberate choice (choice of leisure in terms of consumptions).  
 
Along this line of argument, efforts have been made in the latest literature to 
address the “endogeneity” problem of power within the original collective household 
framework developed by Chiappori, Browning and othersxv. Basu (2001) provided the 
first theoretical exploration of an “Endogenous Power” collective household model and 
preliminary empirical evidence supporting this model comes in from Nepal, Australia and 
India (Koolwal & Ray, 2002; Maitra & Ray, 2003; Lancaster, Maitra & Ray, 2003). 
Basu’s (2001) endogenous power framework extends our attention from the impact of 
household power balance on household decision making to the opposite direction of 
influence: the effect of household decisions on the balance of power. In his model the 
budget share equations of consumption items, the total expenditures and the power 
equation are jointly and endogenously determined. Following the tradition of the 
collective approach, household members of a two-member household are assumed to 
have “caring” preferences: )),(),,(( QqvQqvFU FFMMii = , FMi ,= , and Qqq FM ,,  are 
husband’s and wife’s private consumptions and household public goods respectively. In 
the “caring” preference structure each person cares about the other’s private 
consumptions insofar as such consumptions improve the other person’s utility. The 
household’s problem is to maximize the combined household utility function with 
husband and wife sub-utility functions weighted by the “sharing rule” function, subject to 
the household budget constraint. The sharing rule guides the division of total expenditure 
on nonpublic goods between the two partners conditional on savings and public good 
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expenditure share that were decided in the first stage of household decision making 
(Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori & Lechene, 1994). Besides those variables that 
affect intra-household power balance but do not influence individual preferences (such as 
male and female wage ratesxvi and cultural factors), the endogenous model includes the 
choice of some private goods such as leisure in the sharing rule function θ  as well. 
Hence the sharing rule function is ),( iqzθθ = . For a given power distribution index, the 
household maximizes the household utility function by choosing iq , which may in turn 
cause the relative power weights to change. The household may adjust iq further.  
The balance of power and choice of private goods are thus characterized by a 
dynamic adjustment process. Indeed, “a woman used to domination in the household is 
unlikely to become powerful immediately if the circumstantial conditions change in her 
favor” (Basu, 2001). The current period private consumption choice not only generates 
satisfaction in the present but also affects future intra-household power balance shift. 
Within each period a “sub-game equilibrium” is reached and the household’s 
“consumption path” is generated across periods. Over time a “household equilibrium” 
( )** , iqθ  is reached by employing a “natural equilibrium” idea (Basu, 1999): The 
household’s private consumption is given by ),,( ** θη budgetpriceqi = and its balance of 
power is given by ),( ** iqzθθ = . It is shown that such a household equilibrium exists as 
long as a) θ  is continuous in iq , b) iU  is strictly concave, continuous and increasing in 
iq , and c) budget >0 and price >>0 (Basu, 2001).  
The endogenous collective model implies that if there is a household equilibrium, 
there exists a sub-game perfect equilibrium. However, the existence of a sub-game 
perfect equilibrium does not guarantee consumption levels lying on the household 
equilibrium utility frontier. In other words, even when the outcomes of each game period 
are efficient, those outcomes are not necessarily efficient to the household in the long run. 
This is an interesting point as the collective approach to household was designed to 
capture the efficiency concept. Yet once dynamics are introduced, strategic maneuvering 
by the husband and wife can trap the household in inefficient situationsxvii. Indeed, Udry 
(1996) estimated a 6% efficiency loss in Burkina Faso agricultural household production. 
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The endogenous collective model provides a potential explanation for such incongruity 
between empirical results and theoretical predictions.  
Preliminary empirical results are appearing for countries like India, Nepal and 
Australia (Koolwal & Ray, 2002; Maitra & Ray, 2003; Lancaster, Maitra & Ray, 2003). 
Two empirical estimation strategies are employed in this literature. The first is to jointly 
estimate the structural equation system composed of sharing rule equation, total 
expenditure equation and a system of Engel curves of private goods (Koolwal & Ray, 
2002). The second is to estimate the reduced form of the structural equations (Maitra & 
Ray, 2003). “Income pooling” is the restriction to be tested. In the models the 
endogenous intra-household power (or weight) equation depends on the share of earnings 
and the relative education level between spouses, in addition to other traditional 
exogenous determinants of power. In all the countries tested it is found that the weights 
and hence the relative bargaining power of males and females have statistically 
significant effects on household expenditure patterns. The income pooling hypothesis is 
rejected. The results are consistent with the general collective setting predictions. In 
addition, the relationship between relative power (approximated by the female share of 
household earnings) and household expenditure outcomes is non-monotonic, and such 
relationship varies across commodities. Koolwal and Ray (2002) also found that an 
increase in the woman’s educational experience leads to a rise in her bargaining power, 
over and above a positive indirect relationship between education and power through 
education’s contribution to the rise of woman’s earning capability.  
Two limitations emerge from the empirical literature. First, the results are not 
differentiable from those based on the exogenous collective models. The findings rejected 
the unitary model but are not able to prove the advantage of endogenous models as 
compared with other household models. Second, using education level as both an 
outcome of household decision-making and a determinant in the power function is 
problematic. Formal education is more likely to be an investment decision before the 
formation of household than after. Marriage itself might be conditional on education 
levels, and any continuation of formal education after marriage is likely to be based on a 
pre-marriage agreement between agents without being subject to further bargaining 
within the household. Therefore, choice of education level is not best described by an 
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endogenous collective model. Rather, Konrad and Lommerud’s completely non-
cooperative and partially non-cooperative models that consider both pre- and within-
marriage stages integrate educational decisions better (2000)xviii.  
 
 
4. Non-cooperative Bargaining Models 
 
There has been growing interest in non-cooperative bargaining approach to the 
household. Some of the earliest models were developed as the result of dissatisfaction 
with the Nash (as well as other types of) cooperative bargaining models. The major 
problems with those models include an unrealistic threat point external to the marriage 
and the fact that agreements resulting from bargaining are not self-enforcing at the same 
time when such agreements are little likely to be binding without cost. The non-
cooperative household models so far developed, however, are not fully non-cooperative. 
Rather, those models are typically characterized by a two-stage decision making process 
with non-cooperative bargaining solutions integrated into a generalized Nash cooperative 
game as its fallback position, or the “threat point” (Ulph, 1988; Woolley, 1988; Lundberg 
& Pollak, 1993; Konrad and Lommerud, 1995, 2000; Chen & Woolley, 2001). 
 
Game Theoretic Foundations 
 
Nash’s axioms for a cooperative bargaining solution give us no guidance about the 
appropriate threat points for bargaining in a marriage. Later theoretical work on non-
cooperative bargaining provides solid foundations for appropriate choice of threat points 
(Bergstrom, 1996). Three studies are key to the development of non-cooperative 
household models: Harsanyi and Selton (1976) generalize the Nash solution to a 
cooperative game by relaxing the symmetry assumption, while Rubinstein (1982) and 
Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) integrate a non-cooperative threat point with a 
repeated game with an alternate offering from two agents.  
Rubinstein finds that, in a repeated game with an alternate offering from two 
agents across time periods, when the time interval between offerings approaches 0, at the 
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limit the only perfect equilibrium is the allocation that maximizes the generalized Nash 
product: 22
1
1
αα uu , where α,u  are the utility and weight for each agent. In other words, the 
Rubinstein solution converges to the Nash solution. In a repeated game, α  can be 
considered as each agent’s discount rate, or time preference. It can also be a function of 
law, institutional practices and cultural norms that decide individual’s bargaining power. 
If the two agents have the same discount rate, this outcome is equivalent to a symmetric 
Nash solution with threat point (0,0). Binmore, et al extend the game by including a 
threat point (m1, m2) that represents the utilities agents can get if they break out from the 
game. Therefore m1 and m2 represents the external options for agents. The equilibrium, 
however, is generally not equivalent to an allocation that maximizes 
2
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αα mumu −−  on the possible utility set, which would correspond to a 
generalized Nash solution with threat point shifted to (m1, m2). The reason is that 
fallback utilities should be interpreted as “utilities during conflict” rather than utilities 
that can be obtained by breaking out of the game.  
 
Three Parallel Non-cooperative Household Models 
 
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) propose a separate spheres bargaining model, 
whereby they incorporate into McElroy and Horney’s Nash bargaining framework (1981) 
a non-cooperative “threat point”.xix Compared with the original Nash household, the 
threat point in the separate spheres model is internal to the marriage, which is argued to 
be a more believable threat in day-to-day marital bargaining. Such a model depicts a 
household where resources are allocated in a Nash bargaining process, with the 
alternative reservation level of utility given by non-cooperative utilities characterized by 
gender specialization in the provision of household public goods. For example, during 
household conflict, women may solely take the responsibility of child-caring while men 
contribute nothing to it. The threat point utility is generated when each spouse, taking 
his/her partner’s contribution to the public good as given, maximizes his/her own utilities 
subject to his/her own budget constraint in an unhappy (non-cooperative) marriage. Such 
decision-making process from both sides lead to a pair of “reaction functions” that 
determine a Cournot-Nash equilibrium where the contribution to the public good is 
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inefficiently low. To what and how much the husband and the wife would contribute, or 
are “assumed” to contribute by the opposite party are, according to the authors, based on 
“socially recognized and sanctioned gender roles” (Lundberg & Pollak, 1996). The non-
cooperative allocation serves as the “threat point” in the daily bargaining game. While the 
daily Nash bargaining can be efficient, the fact that the threat point is the inefficient 
outcome of family conflict decides the whole bargaining outcome is inefficient. The 
separate spheres bargaining model and the divorce threat-point model have different 
policy implications. For example, in the divorce threat-point model, redistribution of 
income control within marriage, if having no impact on relative incomes for divorced 
men and women, should have no effect on consumption allocation within marriage. The 
separate spheres model would predict otherwise: Since the threat point in this model is 
internal to the marriage instead of external, even when the chances outside of the 
marriage remain unchanged, bargaining power can shift between the husband and the 
wife in response to a redistribution of income control. 
Another important difference between the cooperative and non-cooperative 
models is the interpretation of efficiency. In the cooperative bargaining model, Pareto 
efficiency can be realized when a) information is symmetric and b) the agreement 
resulting from the bargaining game is binding and costlessly enforceable. These are not 
realistic assumptions. By contrast, non-cooperative models have the advantage of 
focusing on self-enforcing equilibriums, which can be Pareto optimal but not necessarily 
so. When time dimension is incorporated into a repeated game scheme, it is believed that 
non-cooperative bargaining can eventually generate optimal outcomes (see Lundberg & 
Pollak, 1996; Basu, 2000; Ligon, 2003). Therefore, instead of being assumed 
exogenously, efficiency can be achieved endogenously in the non-cooperative approach. 
In the separate sphere model, efficiency is endogenously determined by traditional gender 
roles and social norms. After all, efficiency does not imply harmony (Lommerud, 1995). 
One question raised about the separate social spheres theory is how those social 
norms are maintained. In the framework the traditional norms are taken as given. As Sen 
(1990) points out, people are so used to the gender role assigned to them that they are not 
even aware of their own rights. Some of the social norms that appear to be biased against 
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women are not only accepted by the men but also reinforced by women as well. The 
endogeneity of social norms is not considered in the separate sphere model.  
Chen and Woolley (2001) have developed a Cournot-Nash model of family 
decision-making based on some of their earlier models attempting to describe non-
cooperative bargaining within household. The Chen-Woolley model, like the Lundberg-
Pollak model of separate spheres, combines a non-cooperative threat point with a Nash 
solution to a cooperative bargaining problem. The two models differ in their treatment of 
non-cooperative threat points. The most important feature of the C-W model is 
“voluntary transfer” between household members. It is this “voluntary” element that 
makes the bargaining outcome self-enforcing. In the first stage of bargaining, a “pre-
transfer equilibrium” is established in a context in which no transfer occurs between 
husband and wife. Each spouse maximizes his or her own objective utility function 
subject to individual budget constraint, taking partner’s contribution to household public 
good as given. This stage is a typical non-cooperative game. Each spouse’s utility 
depends on his/her own utility as well as the partner’s utility with an assigned weight of s 
(representing the degree of “caring” for the partner). Therefore, as in the collective 
approach, the household preference structure is assumed to be “caring”, which in general 
involves separability (Spouse cares about his/her partner only in terms of the partner’s 
utility, not the amount of consumption itself) and cardinalization (Bourguignon & 
Chiappori, 1992). “Caring” is treated as exogenous. Preference on private and public 
goods is also separable. The utility for person i therefore can be written as:  
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where ji xx ,  are private consumptions and 
h
j
h
i xx ,  are contributions to public goods. The 
household utility is then the weighted average of both agents’ welfare function. Husband 
and wife’s relative income defines a “contribution threshold” aI : Suppose wife has lower 
income. aI  is then on the interval between 0 and husband’s income. When her income is 
lower than the contribution threshold, the pre-transfer equilibrium is a corner solution in 
which only the husband contributes to household public good. Otherwise an interior 
solution is obtained in which both partners contribute to public good.  
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In the second stage transfer is allowed. Chen and Woolley argue that if wife’s 
income is above the contribution threshold, a small transfer from husband to wife has no 
effect on either person’s private consumption or the provision of household public good, 
if the couple face the same price in household public good provisionxx. The more 
interesting case is when wife’s income is lower than aI . On the interval between 0 and 
aI , there exits a “transfer threshold” bI . If wife’s income were lower than the threshold, 
a small transfer from husband to wife would raise husband’s welfare. When wife’s 
income is higher than the transfer threshold, a small transfer reduces husband’s welfare. 
The interval (0, bI ) defines voluntary transfer equilibrium. Husband and wife’s relative 
income defines the location of the two threshold points aI  and bI , whereas the distance 
between the two points is a function of the degree of caring: )(sf .  
The transfer decision described in stage two is completely under the control of the 
husband. In real life the husband does not have all the bargaining power, and the wife can 
either accept or reject the transfer. In addition, the amount of transfer is not decided. 
Therefore, in the last stage of the game, once agents decide transfer is favorable, they 
have to negotiate the amount of transfer via a generalized Nash solution to a cooperative 
bargaining game, with the “pre-transfer equilibrium” as each agent’s reservation utility: 
αα
π ππ −−− 1)]0()([)]0()([max jjii WWWW  
where )(⋅W  is the utility when there is no transfer (0) and when there is a transfer amount 
of π . The amount of transfer now depends on α , representing power, and s, representing 
the degree of caringxxi.  
Given the theoretical framework, Chen and Woolley suggest several empirical 
tests. We can examine the effect of male/female relative income on public good 
provision. We can also examine the flow of financial transfers between spouses and the 
extent of income sharing. The theoretical predictions of the Chen-Woolley model are 
consistent with the four types of household financial management developed in 
sociology: whole-wage, allowance system, independent management and shared 
management (see Pahl, 1983 for details). The tests suggested by Chen and Woolley, 
however, cannot single the model out as the only correct one. Those tests serve to reject 
the unitary model and can say nothing more. 
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The Chen-Woolley model does not consider such dynamic aspects as education of 
spouses or investment in children. Konrad and Lommerud (2000) consider a model in 
which couples choose the amount of education and hence the capability of earning 
market labor return in the first stage (See the addendum for a discussion on a set of 
education issues to which intra-household theories can be applied). Long-term decisions 
(investment in education in the K-L model) at the outset of marriage are taken non-
cooperatively. The later day-to-day management of the family is reached in efficient 
bargaining, but with non-cooperative behavior as the fallback position. Taking the future 
period bargaining positions into consideration, household members tend to over-invest in 
education in the first period so that he/she obtains higher market value in the second 
period. Higher earnings capability then improves the individual’s bargaining power 
within family, which produces an incentive of over-investment in education. Over-
investment in education and over engaging in market labor result in an under-supply of 
household public good and therefore the equilibrium thus reached is sub-optimal.  
The key contribution of Konrad and Lommerud is that they compare the 
inefficiency resulting from a fully non-cooperative game and a semi-cooperative game. 
Observationally we observe an under-supply of public good. A fully non-cooperative 
game theory explains that because in each period of the game investing too much in 
household good productivity rather than market labor productivity makes agents 
vulnerable in future bargaining. And so decisions are made non-cooperatively. A semi-
cooperative game theory explains that the efficiency is caused by over-investment at the 
outset of marriage. In the time period that follows, household members engage in 
cooperative bargaining using the first period non-cooperative outcome as the “threat 
point”. The policy treatment to correct the under-supply of household good is different, 
depending on how to interpret family behavior. The first best policy treatment to correct 
public good distortion is to stimulate public good provisions directly. The second best 
policy to counter the distortion is to curb the over-investment in education by levying an 
education tax for example. Konrad and Lommerud argue that the two policies have same 
effect on household behavior if fully non-cooperative bargaining is the cause of 
inefficiency. Yet the effect would be different if the family engaged in semi-cooperative 
bargaining. In the semi-cooperative scheme, the allocation given education investment in 
 34
the second stage is efficient, and so policies stimulating public good provisions would 
have no effect. Here the primary distortion is in fact over-education. Therefore policies 
targeting education investment, such as an education tax, should be the first best choice.  
Although the study has important policy implications, unfortunately Konrad and 
Lommerud do not provide testing strategies that can be used to distinguish which 
underlying game represents the reality better, given the observationally same household 
behaviors. Appropriate data need to be collected to find empirical evidence. In addition, 
the K-L model also needs to consider marital matching between educationally similar 
couples. If the semi-cooperative model is realistic, and education is used as the fallback 
position in future bargaining games, then each person has the incentive to compete for a 
favorable bargaining position by marrying a partner with lower education levels rather 
than someone with similar education backgrounds. But the latter type of matching seems 
to be more frequent in real life. 
 
Recent Development 
 
Although there is growing interest in non-cooperative models (or, more 
accurately, cooperative models with non-cooperative threat points), little work has been 
done to derive testable restrictions that characterize a non-cooperative game. The most 
recent effort in this direction that the author is aware of is Lechene and Preston’s 
derivation of departures from Slutsky symmetry in non-cooperative household demand 
models (2003). Unfortunately, the study is preliminary and incomplete as it is posted on 
the Center for Household, Income, Labor and Demographic Economics (CHILD) web 
site. 
 
 
5. Empirical Tests and Evidence 
 
Empirical Difficulties 
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The testable restrictions derived for each of the three categories of models are 
very limited, most of the time due to insufficient information available from existing 
datasets. Those restrictions range from the very simple but not very powerful ones such 
as the “income pooling” hypothesis, to the very complicated but powerful Slutsky matrix 
generalizations. Rejecting “income pooling” lends some support for bargaining models as 
contrasted with the traditional unitary models, but cannot by itself prove any specific 
form of bargaining model is correct. On the other hand, the distinctive properties of the 
generalized Slutsky matrix in either the cooperative bargaining settings or the collective 
settings are not easy to test because, for example, utility if divorced is not observable in 
the cooperative settings while price variance is very hard to obtain in the collective 
settings.  
As the bargaining approach to household economics focuses on individuals 
instead of households, it imposes extra requirements on household expenditure and 
income data for more detailed information. At the same time, as the models now 
generally consider the interaction between heterogeneous preferences and power 
distributions, subject to individualistic budget constraints, more parameters need to be 
estimated. This adds extra difficulty to empirical studies in addition to data limitations. 
Without making further assumptions, imposing structural restrictions, or collecting new 
information, models are not identified. McElroy and Horney (1990) and McElroy (1990) 
suggest using unmarried individual’s preference to approximate married couple’s utility 
if they divorce. Chiappori (1997) and Deaton (1997) suggest the use of assignable goods 
or a pair of exclusive goods. Kapteyn and Kooreman (1992) and Kusago and Barham 
(2001) suggest the use of additional preference information collected directly from 
interview. All these examples collect extra information in various ways to identify 
parametric models. 
The most fundamental difficulty, for the bargaining models as well as the neo-
classic models, is “observational equivalence”: Different theoretical models predict 
observationally indistinguishable household behavior patterns. Put it another way, what 
economists observe can be as successfully explained by several models. For example, 
Senauer, Sahn and Alderman (1986) find that in Sri Lanka an increase in women’s 
earnings results in higher expenditures on bread than on rice. This can be attributed either 
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to changes in relative prices due to the increased value of women’s time, or to women’s 
increased bargaining power (and women systematically prefer bread more than men), or 
to both.  
Despite the difficulties, numerous studies are able to reject the unitary model and 
examine the household black box more closely. Typically those studies take advantage of 
existing data on both spouses’ incomes and information on one assignable good or a pair 
of exclusive goods. In most occasions the “income pooling” hypothesis is tested since the 
unitary model predicts that after the total expenditure is controlled, source of income 
(whether the income accrues to the husband or the wife) should not affect consumption 
choices. In a few other studies the efficiency assumption is tested. Since bargaining 
models consider household behavior as the outcome of two factors: power, and 
preference, the measurement (or, more precisely, inference) of the two factors is not 
without problems. Many empirical researchers (for example, Hoddinott and Adam, 1998; 
Pollak, 1994) note that, since individual income is considered as a factor deciding 
bargaining power, it should be exogenously given. Yet income is obviously endogenous 
to household choices of consumption and leisure. To solve the problem some studies (for 
example, Thomas, 1990) use non-wage income as the power indicator. However, 
although non-wage income such as pension or property income is independent with 
current household decisions and therefore might mitigate the endogeneity problem, it 
carries over earlier household decisions. Some researchers further improve on power 
approximation by using dowry or parental wealth (for example, Thomas, Contreras & 
Frankenberg, 2002). The best studies in this group use a quasi-experimental power shift 
resulting from a sudden change in children allowance policy (Lundberg, Pollak & Wales, 
or divorce law (Hoddinott and Adam, 1998). Lundberg, Pollak and Wales use data 
collected before and after the change of the children allowance regulation from a 
longitudinal household survey in the UK, while Hoddinott and Adam (1998) implement a 
difference-in-difference analysis by exploiting the fact that the divorce law changed in 
some Canadian provinces earlier than in the other regions. On the other hand, 
heterogeneous preferences are inferred from household behavior. The implicit 
assumption is that male and female preferences differ systematically in the whole sample. 
Only then can we infer that, for example, different male and female income effect on 
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children’s nutrition intake imply different levels of caring about children’s welfare. Such 
assumption may not be realistic. Kapteyn and Kooreman (1992) and Kusago & Barham 
(2001) therefore use direct preference information instead of using the inferential 
approach. Finally, another typical problem in the income-pooling test is that we need to 
control for total expenditure, which might be affected by occasional purchase of 
expensive items. Such occasional purchase is not observable in the data, and so the 
information is included in the stochastic term, resulting in a non-zero regressor-error 
correlation. A typical empirical strategy for dealing with the problem is to instrument 
total expenditure with household income. In some cases researchers use regional wage 
levels (see Attanasio & Lechene, 2002). 
One recent study by Browning and Lechene (2003) makes an attempt to 
differentiate between three non-unitary models: cooperative bargaining, non-cooperative 
bargaining and cooperative bargaining with non-cooperative equilibrium as the fallback 
positionxxii. They also try to distinguish between caring and selfish preferences. They take 
advantage of the fact that the provision of public and private goods is not monotonically 
increasing in the wife’s share of household income. Different types of models interact 
with preferences to generate different shapes (bending points) of demand curves. Using 
the Canadian household expenditure data, they find evidence against both non-
cooperative behavior and a bargaining game with non-cooperative threat point. Income 
pooling is again rejected, and preference is caring (see the definition in section 3). They 
conclude that the data are consistent with a collective model with caring partners. The 
idea is very innovative. However, the study suffers from a logic flaw in that although 
models predict distinctive curve shapes, a specific shape derived from data does not 
prove one of the models should be the only correct one unless that shape occurs if and 
only if that model is the underlying driving force.  
 
Empirical Evidence 
 
Household economics covers a wide and complicated range of intra-family 
relations. Besides the intra-generational relation between spouses, intergenerational 
relationships are also examined in the literature. The areas covered in the intra-
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generational relation include family violence, male and female consumptions and 
household production. Intergenerational studies cover children’s health, nutrition intake, 
education expenditures, difference between investment in boys versus girls and adult 
children’s support for parents. The table in the appendix lists some of the important and 
most recent evidence on intrahousehold bargaining.  
Generally speaking, the following findings are consistently supported by 
empirical evidence: 
• Income is not pooled. The unitary model is consistently rejected.  
• Although household consumption might be efficient, household production is 
not.  
• In terms of household consumption, mothers care more about children’s 
welfare. Empowering mothers through marital law change, children’s 
allowance scheme, education, and increased income leads to more spending 
on children’s and women’s consumption and health relative to spending on 
men.  
• Fathers and mothers also have different preferences on boys and girls. It 
appears that fathers invest more in sons while mothers invest more in 
daughters. Such a phenomenon may be explained by higher returns to the 
mothers by daughters and higher returns to the fathers by the sons.  
• Empowering women also reduces fertility and women’s share of housework 
but improves household health by reducing the consumption of tobacco and 
alcohol (vices).  
• In terms of household production, it is found that about 6% of output is lost 
due to inefficiency in Burkina Faso (Udry, 1996). Women tend to shun away 
from uncertainty by voluntarily channeling productive capital to men (Ligon, 
2003).  
• Finally, household production and consumption are not independent. As 
suggested in the endogenous collective models developed by Basu, labor 
supply and goods consumption are not separable. Therefore the sharing rule is 
endogenously decided. This point finds empirical support from Browning and 
Meghir’s study (1991) on a family expenditure data set from the UK. They 
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conclude that labor supply and goods consumption are indeed intertwined. In 
addition, they find that male and female labor supplies are not substitutable in 
their effect on the demand system. Estimates of demand that only take account 
of labor participation without controlling for hours of work are likely to be 
biased. Ignoring labor supply completely results in even more bias in demand 
estimates.  
All of this evidence can be found in developed countries as well as developing 
countries. The source of power is found to come from market labor wage rates, 
inheritance tradition, social norm and institutions such as alimony rights and divorce 
laws.  
 
 
6. Policy Implications and Limitations of Intra-household Models 
 
Household economics extends beyond marriage. Most of the bargaining models 
that exist today take an existing marriage as given, ignoring marital market selection and 
matching. However, intra-household bargaining potentially gives household economics 
within and beyond marriage richer contents. The introduction of a threat point, for 
example, links pre- and post-marriage stages together. Arrangements after divorce not 
only affect divorced individuals but also influence the behavior of married couples (Boca, 
2001). On the other hand, policies targeting children’s welfare will not only incur within 
household re-negotiation in the short run, but will also make the individuals in the 
marriage market adjust their selection and matching choices of partners in the long 
run.xxiii  
The development of intra-household resource allocation models has important 
policy implications. Haddad and Kanbur (1991) note the link between the intra-household 
literature and the literature on targeting.xxiv The research on intra-household economics 
by studying the mechanism within the black box of “household” can improve the 
accuracy and effectiveness of social welfare and human development policies and 
programs. For example, in the 1970s a social welfare policy change was proposed in the 
UK regarding children’s allowance. Before the proposal the allowance was deducted 
 40
from the amount of tax withheld from father’s paycheck. It was proposed that the 
allowance should be replaced by a cash payment to the mother. The implication of such a 
policy change was not clear until Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1996) found that the new 
allowance scheme put more resource under the control of the mother, significantly 
improved children’s welfare. A second example, due to Lundberg and Pollak (1996), is 
the long-standing debate on the topic of reducing the birth rates in developing countries. 
One side of the debate insisted on family planning services while the other side supported 
women empowerment. In the traditional unitary models of family it would be hard to 
interpret how women empowerment could ever be linked to reduction in birth rate. But 
proponents of the latter alternative suggest that husband and wife have different 
preferences, and that more power given to women can lead to the policy goal. Based on 
the unitary household framework, some programs led to unexpected results. For example, 
the school-feeding program in the Philippines in the mid 1990s did not consider which 
family member the program should target. As a result, children’s calorie intake decreased 
in some cases because the extra food from schools led to dramatic reduction in food 
allocated to them at home. Jacoby (2002) calls this phenomenon a “flypaper effect” 
because children’s benefits from the program were “taxed” by family members.  
The exploration into the black box of family not only supports more efficient 
policy and program designs, but also provides additional powerful policy instruments. 
For example, a hundred dollars reallocated to the wife not only improves her welfare 
directly from the extra amount of goods she can purchase with the money, but it also has 
a far-reaching effect by increasing her relative power with the household. Even the 
prospect of getting a hundred dollars without actually receiving it can improve the wife’s 
benefit. Taking all these factors into consideration creates new powerful policy tools, 
whereas failure to do so may lead to unexpected and undesirable results.  
There is still a lot to do before intra-household theories can help policy design 
improve further. The existing bargaining models have developed mainly in response to 
the dissatisfaction with the neoclassical unitary household model and focus on alternative 
ways to re-interpret observed household economic behaviors. A lot of emphasis has been 
put on refuting the unitary model. Yet rejecting the properties that characterize the 
unitary model does not by itself prove any specific bargaining model to be the correct 
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model. There are also few testable restrictions that can effectively distinguish among the 
class of bargaining models. The question of how household members allocate resources 
that was locked in the black box by the unitary model, and the more fundamental 
question of why households choose the way in which they make allocation decisions still 
remain largely unanswered. Before the advent of bargaining household models, a rich 
variety of models have been developed within the neoclassical framework to explain the 
same set of observed behavior. One good example is unequal boy’s and girl’s nutrition 
intake in some developing countries. This phenomenon can be explained by arguing that 
parents prefer boys to girls. It can be explained by higher market return to investing in 
boys as well. It can also be argued that boys engage in more intensive labor and so they 
need more nutrition. Behrman, Pollak and Taubman (1982) develop a model that 
integrates both preference and market opportunity concerns. An observed unequal 
distribution of nutrition between boys and girls does not immediately reveal parental 
preferences: Such an allocation might be endowment-reinforcing, but it might be 
endowment-compensatory as well. This example shows us the greatest difficulty of 
household economics: Observationally similar behavior can be interpreted by lots of 
models that have different policy implications. Without being able to distinguish between 
non-unitary models, it is hard to choose the correct policy tools.  
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Appendix: Empirical Studies within the Intra-household Bargaining Framework 
Study Topic Country/Re
gion 
Model Findings Notes 
      
      
Anxo & Carlin 
(2003) 
Housework France Bargaining 
model and 
specialization 
model 
Controlled for endogeneity, greater 
husband’s share of labor income leads to 
lower male share of housework. The 
reverse is true when wife’s share of 
labor income increases. The own wage 
elasticity of wife’s housework is -.3 and 
husband’s housework elasticity with 
respect to wife’s wage is .25 
 
 
Attanasio & 
Lechene (2002) 
Household 
consumption 
pattern, source of 
power 
Mexico  Differential 
preference 
model 
Global income pooling is rejected. 
Women’s income share is positively 
related with her decision making power 
 
PROGRESA as 
exogenous power 
shift factor 
Beegle, 
Frankenberg & 
Thomas (2001) 
Child bearing and 
birth health 
Indonesia Cooperative 
bargaining 
Four dimensions of power: asset share, 
education, relative social status of 
husband and wife’s family, relative 
education level of father versus father-
in-law. More female power leads to 
better reproductive health choices. 
 
 
Blacklow & Ray 
(2003) 
Household 
consumption patter 
and tax policy 
Australia Collective 
settings 
Identical preference is rejected. Price 
and expenditure elasticity of demand 
differs between family members, and so 
the marginal social cost of raising 
revenue by taxing is also different. 
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Breunig & 
Dasgupta (2000) 
Welfare of children 
and the elderly 
US  Non-
cooperative 
bargaining 
Welfare cutbacks that increase 
household income may in fact reduce 
the well being of children and elderly. 
Special notice is paid to welfare income 
and market income effect. 
 
Food stamp 
Brown (2002) Dowry and 
women’s welfare 
China Cooperative 
Nash 
bargaining 
Dowry is positively associated with 
women’s welfare such as leisure time 
and consumption on women’s private 
goods. More dowry also puts women in 
a favorable position when dispute arises 
within family 
 
 
Browning & 
Meghir (1991) 
Interaction of labor 
supply and 
commodity 
demands 
UK Differential 
preference 
model 
Labor supply and commodity demands 
are endogenously decided. Male and 
female labor decisions have different 
effects on demands. 
 
 
Browning, 
Bourguignon, 
Chiappori & 
Lechene (1994) 
Household 
expenditure pattern 
Canada Collective 
setting 
Relative incomes, ages and the level of 
lifetime wealth have substantially 
significant impact on expenditure 
allocations.  
 
 
Browning & 
Chiappori (1998) 
Household demand Canada Collective 
setting 
Slutsky matrix is not symmetric. Income 
is not pooled. Predictions of unitary 
model are rejected for couples but not 
for singles. Predictions of collective 
settings are not rejected for couples. 
 
A rare but powerful 
study looking at 
both price and 
income effect 
Bubois & Ligon Food and nutrition The Collective Unitary allocation of food and nutrition  
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(2003) allocation Philippines setting with 
incentive and 
productivity 
considerations 
is rejected. Allocation of food depends 
on both providing incentives and 
productivity considerations 
 
Chiappori, Fortin 
& Lacroix (2001) 
Marriage market, 
household labor 
supply 
US Collective 
settings 
Sex ratio and divorce law in favor of 
women lead to favorable changes in 
female labor supply change 
 
 
Duflo & Udry 
(2003) 
Household 
expenditure 
patterns affected by 
uncertainty 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
Semi-
cooperative 
bargaining 
Conditional on overall levels of 
expenditure, the composition of 
household expenditure is sensitive to the 
gender of the recipient of a rainfall 
shock. Positive “shocks” on women’s 
crop shifts expenditure towards food. 
Adverse shocks on men’s production 
take toll on food and education 
provisions. Different sources of income 
are allocated for different uses 
according to social norms on gender 
roles. 
 
 
Duflo (2000) Child nutrition South 
Africa  
Cooperative 
bargaining 
Pensions received by grandmothers have 
a large impact on the anthropometric 
status of girls but no effect on that of 
boys. No similar effect is found with 
pensions received by men 
 
Pension scheme 
change 
Gibson (2003) Household 
expenditure pattern 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Differential 
preference 
model 
Women’s share of control over 
expenditure has different effects on 
household expenditure pattern than 
men’s share of control. Therefore 
Using both income 
and expenditure 
data.  
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without increasing women’s income, 
policy tools are still available to affect 
household expenditure pattern. 
 
Hoddinott & Adam 
(1998) 
Suicide and divorce 
law 
Canada Cooperative 
bargaining 
Change in the divorce law in Canada 
leads to improvements in women’s 
expected settlement upon divorce, 
which results in reduced suicide rates 
for older married women. No effects are 
found with younger unmarried women 
 
Divorce law change 
as quasi-experiment 
Hoddinott & 
Haddad (1995) 
Household 
expenditure pattern 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
Non-
cooperative 
bargaining 
Raising wife’s share of cash income 
increases food expenditure and reduces 
the budget shares of alcohol and 
cigarette. 
 
 
Jacoby (2002) Children’s food 
consumption 
The 
Philippines 
Differential 
preference 
Without considering intrahousehold 
allocation, school feed program leads to 
reduction in children’s home food 
consumption. As a result, the total food 
for children decreases in some cases 
 
Quasi-experiment 
Koolwal & Ray 
(2002)  
Household 
consumptions and 
source of power 
Nepal Endogenous 
collective 
settings 
Women empowerment leads to different 
household consumption patterns. 
Education level increases women’s 
power in addition to her share of income 
 
 
Kapteyn & 
Kooreman (1990) 
Labor Supply The 
Netherlands 
Cooperative 
bargaining 
Utility functions of spouses are 
significantly different. 
Preferred working 
hours as additional 
identifying 
information 
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Lancaster, Maitra 
& Ray (2003) 
Household 
expenditure pattern, 
gender bias 
India Endogenous 
collective 
settings 
There is significant gender bias in 
education expenditures. The bias is not 
always in favor of boys, depending on 
the regions. Bargaining power has 
varied effects on different consumption 
items 
 
 
Lich-Tyler Inter-temporal 
allocation strategies 
US Dynamic 
cooperative 
bargaining 
Increase in difficulty of divorce leads 
families to choose prescient inter-
temporal strategy. Decrease in the 
difficulty leads to myopic strategy. Few 
families adopt the contractual strategy 
 
 
Lundberg, Pollak 
& Wales (1996) 
Household 
expenditure pattern 
UK Cooperative 
bargaining 
Shifting child allowance from granting 
to father to giving to mother leads to 
increased share of expenditure on 
children and women’s clothings. 
 
Quasi-experiment 
from child 
allowance policy 
change 
Maitra & Ray 
(2002) 
Household 
expenditure pattern 
South 
Africa  
Collective 
settings 
Sources of income have different impact 
on expenditure patterns, depending on 
who is the recipient of the income. 
Neither income nor non-labor earnings 
is pooled. 
 
Social pension 
scheme change as 
quasi-experiment 
Maitra & Ray 
(2003) 
Household 
expenditure pattern 
Australia Endogenous 
collective 
settings 
The relative spousal power has effect on 
expenditure patterns. The effect varies a 
great deal across commodities 
 
 
Maitra (2003) Children’s health 
and mortality 
India Collective 
settings 
A woman’s education has larger impact 
on positive health choice than man’s 
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education; Women’s control of 
household resources has similar impact. 
 
Phipps & Burton 
(1998) 
Household 
expenditure pattern 
Canada Semi-
cooperative 
bargaining 
Income is pooled for housing but not for 
other consumptions. Traditional gender 
roles decide whose money is mainly 
used for what. 
 
 
Quisumbing & 
Maluccio (2003) 
Children’s 
education 
expenditure 
Bangladesh, 
Ethiopia, 
Indonesia, 
South 
Africa 
Differential 
preferences 
The unitary household explanation is 
rejected in four countries. The allocation 
is Pareto-efficient. In Bangladesh and 
South Africa women’s asset shares 
increase education expenditures. In 
Ethiopia however, it is men’s asset 
shares that matter. 
 
 
Quisumbing 
(1994) 
Intergenerational 
transfer 
The 
Philippines 
Differential 
preferences 
Parents exhibit preferential behavior 
towards children of their own gender. 
 
 
Rangel (2003) Women’s labor 
supply, teenage 
girl’s schooling 
Brazil Cooperative 
bargaining 
Empowerment of women through 
alimony rights extension to cohabitants 
reduces women’s labor supply and 
redistributes resources to girl’s 
education. 
 
Alimony rights 
change as 
exogenous source 
of power change 
Rubalcava & 
Thomas (2000) 
Household 
allocation patterns 
US  Cooperative 
bargaining 
AFDC pays to single women with 
children, which leads to improved 
divorce fallback position in family 
bargaining. Consumption patterns 
change as a result for lower income 
families with very young children. 
AFDC as fallback 
position of a 
bargaining game 
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Rubalcava, Teruel 
& Thomas (2002) 
Children’s clothing, 
food 
Mexico  Cooperative 
bargaining 
Empowering mothers through 
exogenous funding improves children’s 
and adults’ welfare. 
 
Using PROGRESA 
as exogenous power 
shifting factor 
Schultz (1990) Labor supply and 
fertility 
Thailand Nash 
cooperative 
Women with more bargaining power are 
shown to prefer more leisure and having 
more children. Men also prefer more 
leisure when they have more un-earned 
incomes. However, the causation of 
more un-earned income on preferring 
more children may be the other way 
round. 
 
 
Stevenson & 
Wolfers (2003) 
Family distress and 
divorce law 
US Cooperative 
bargaining 
Allowing unilateral divorce contributes 
to a large and significant reduction in 
women suicide, murder and domestic 
violence. No effect on men.  
 
Divorce law reform 
as quasi-experiment 
Tauchen, Witte & 
Long (1991) 
Domestic violence US Differential 
preference 
For low-income families, rise of 
injurer’s income increases violence 
while rise of victim’s income has no 
effect. For high-income families, rise of 
injurer’s income and rise of victim’s 
income both reduce violence 
 
 
Thomas (1990) Family health Brazil Differential 
preferences 
Resources controlled in the hands of 
mother have different impact on family 
health than resources controlled by the 
father. Maternal resources lead to 
twenty times higher child survival 
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probability than the same level of 
paternal resources. Mothers prefer to 
devote resources to the health of 
daughters and fathers to sons.  
 
Thomas (1994) Child height US, Brazil, 
Ghana 
Differential 
preferences 
Mother’s education has larger effect on 
daughter’s height and father’s education 
has larger effect on son’s height. In 
Brazil, women’s nonlabor income has 
effect on daughter’s health but not her 
son’s 
 
 
Thomas, Contreras 
& Frankenberg 
(2002) 
Child health Indonesia Cooperative 
bargaining 
Child health is affected by the relative 
wealth brought into the marriage by men 
and women. The bargaining outcome is 
efficient. 
 
Javanese tradition 
makes premarital 
assets good 
indicator of power 
Udry (1996) Household 
production 
Burkina 
Faso 
Differential 
preferences 
Agricultural household production 
allocation is not efficient. Women’s 
plots are farmed less intensively than 
similar men’s plots. About 6 percent of 
outcome is lost due to such inefficient 
allocations 
 
 
Zhang & Chan 
(1999) 
Dowry and 
women’s welfare 
Taiwan Cooperative 
bargaining 
A dowry improves bride’s welfare but 
bride price has no effect 
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i The difference between the Nash solution and the K-S solution is that, in addition to all the assumptions 
made, the Nash solution satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives property (Nash, 1953, quoted 
in Manser & Brown, 1980). The K-S solution instead assumes the property of monotonicity, which states 
that “…if, for every utility level that player 1 may demand, the maximum feasible utility level that player 2 
can simultaneously reach is increased, then the utility level assigned to player 2 according to the solution 
should also be increased” (Kalai & Smorodinsky, 1975, p.515, quoted in Manser & Brown, 1980).  
ii Chiappori (1988b) in his comment on McElroy and Horney’s work finds the expression for the inverse of 
G is in fact singular and thus not invertible. The expression for G, however, is correct and invertible. 
iii The Nash hypothesis for implication a) is described as: ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−=−
−
1
11
III DVSGXX FM ; b) is described 
as: αα DVSGX
1−= ; c) can be examined by showing the symmetry and negative semidefiniteness of the 
generalized Slutsky matrix. 
iv See the discussion in Blundell and Lewbel (1991) and Deaton (1997) on the analysis of equivalence 
scales. 
v Violence can be considered as a bargaining tool. But it can also be interpreted as the outcome of 
household power distribution. 
vi Such arguments are more likely untrue, however, for inter-generational relationship within the household. 
Borrowing from evolution biology and anthropology, Bergstrom (1996) summarizes two competing 
characterizations of inter-generational relationship (wealth flow as an observable example): Kaplan’s 
biological evolution theory (1994), and Turke (1989) and Caldwell (1978)’s transitional society theory. The 
evolution theory argues that wealth flows from parents to children because the genetically more caring 
species would eventually have more offspring that are also caring than species that regard offspring as 
assets. The transitional society theory argues that in pre-transitional societies, children are assets of parents 
and so wealth flows from children to parents overall. Anthropological evidence predominantly supports 
Kaplan’s prediction that wealth flows from parents to children (Fricke, 1990; Kaplan, 1994). Indeed, using 
the Consumer Expenditure Survey, Lee and Miller (1994) find that in the US the net payment from parents 
to children is about $25,000, with an additional $81,000 child rearing cost. 
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vii Strauss, Mwabu and Beegle (2000) point out that in dynamic models of household, it is possible that the 
preferences of partners converge over time, as the partners become more alike and get accustomed with and 
identified with each other’s values. However, the authors also admit the great difficulties involved in 
modeling such taste formulation across time. 
viii Exclusive goods are included along with private goods in the collective settings. Together they are 
termed as nonpublic. This lineup is for the sake of establishing a clean theoretical framework. As pointed 
out in Browning, et al (1994), both public and private goods can be exclusive goods. They give the 
example of cigarette and telephone. The former is a private good but if only one person smokes, it is 
exclusive. Whereas the latter is a public good, if only one person ever uses it, it is also categorized as 
exclusive. 
ix Strauss, et al (2000) indicates that the separability assumption in the preference structure might be a 
problem. They quote from Kapteyn and Kooreman (1992) and argue that such an assumption can be too 
strong. One hypothetical example given in Strauss is that meals eaten together may not be equivalent to 
meals taken separately, yet under separability no difference would be permitted. However, Browning et al 
(1994) notes that without condition iii it is still possible to define and identify a sharing rule (see p.1074). 
x Chiappori (1997) points out that with altruistic preferences, the sharing rule interpretation is no longer 
equivalent to efficiency in general. The efficiency equivalence interpretation also does not hold in the 
“caring” case for “too unfair” sharing rules because intuitively, if partners care about each other, making 
household allocation less unfair improves both side’s utility. The incompatibility between the collective 
setting and efficiency is found in the empirical literature (for example, Jones, 1983, 1986; Udry, 1996). But 
as Chiappori points out, the fact that the sharing rule idea is not compatible with efficiency does not 
necessary imply that it is irrelevant. Strauss et al (2000) points out that it is important to distinguish 
production efficiency with consumption efficiency. Production inefficiency does not necessarily imply 
consumption inefficiency. In fact, production allocations may be potentially socially inefficient because of 
intra-household disputes. Another theoretical development that reconciles the incompatibility is the 
endogenous power framework developed by Basu (2001). 
xi As pointed out by Chiappori (1997), an attractive property of the sharing rule interpretation is that it 
provides a description of the decision making process that is independent of the particular, cardinal 
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representation of preferences. It is very difficult to distinguish empirically between ordinally equivalent but 
cardinally different utility functions. The Nash bargaining models suffer from the difficulty by contrast (pp 
43-44). 
xii In the sharing rule interpretation, the amount of good i consumed by M is a function of sharing rule, price 
of good i, conditional on expenditure allocated to public goods. The amount of good i consumed by F 
depends on total income minus public expenditure and private expenditure of M. Therefore, the demand 
function is given by 
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Take the partial derivatives we can get the two ratio equations. Strauss, et al (2000)’s exposition of the two 
ratio equations is wrong (p. 98), and although Deaton (1997) provides the framework correctly, there seems 
to be a typo in the equations presented in his work (equation 4.10, p.228). 
xiii If ,)','( wwpxp ≤⋅  and ),()','( wpxwpx ≠ , then '),(' wwpxp >⋅ . 
xiv Chiappori (1997) explained intuitively why the matrix in addition to the traditional symmetric negative-
semidefinite matrix should have at most rank 1. Basically price change incurs the utility frontier to span 
inward or outward. Then on the new frontier, as µ has also changed, the point of allocation moves along 
the new frontier. With a 2-person household, the movement of allocation along the frontier occurs in a one-
dimensional space, no matter how many goods the household consumes.  
xv There are anthropological and sociological evidence that woman’s contribution in the household or 
household farm is not valued the same as her actual earnings from the market, even though her work at 
home enabled the husband to go out and earn a wage (Basu, 2001, Mencher, 1988, Riley, 1997). This 
phenomenon is also observed in the context of American labor market (Zelizer, 1994). The choice of going 
to the market, in turn, is a voluntary choice that is often decided by social norms and traditional perceptions 
on the role of men and women (Alderman, Haddad & Hoddinott, 1997). Sen (1990) pointed out that such 
gender role inequalities reflect the perceived legitimacy as seen by women as well as men.  
xvi Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori & Lechene (1994) pointed out the possibility that wage rate may 
also affect individual preferences. For example, it is not completely impossible that a better-paid job 
requires more expensive clothing.  
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xvii Basu (2001) suggested two schemes where inefficiency may occur and persist. First, assuming the 
husband preference dominates in the first period. Among all the feasible set of utilities the husband may 
stick to the strategy of not letting the wife to work to maintain his power. In this scheme there is an 
inefficient under-provision of market labor. Second, the apprehension that to work less would diminish 
bargaining power in future household decisions may lead to an inefficient over-provision of labor. That is, 
household members work more than they would ideally like. 
xviii Their models will be discussed at the end of the following section. 
xix Kusago and Barham (2001) apply the concept of separate spheres to the analysis of rural Malaysian 
household decision-making. Thomas, Contreras and Frankenberg (2002) also pay special attention to role 
specialization within family in their study on Indonesia families. 
xx This corresponds to the surprising and remarkable result due to Warr (1983) and the result is sometimes 
called “neutrality”. It states that if a group of agents are all voluntarily contributing to a public good then 
small re-distributions of income will not lead to any changes in the allocation to any public or private 
goods. 
xxi Carter and Katz (1997) and Katz (1995) develop a similar model that models intra-household transfer. 
Their model is called “conjugal contract model”. It differs from the Chen-Woolley model in two ways: It 
allows both labor and income transfer. And it examines voluntary transfer to partner’s private consumption 
and household-produced goods. The conjugal contract model also uses a non-cooperative bargaining 
framework to decide intra-household transfer and a cooperative framework to determine the levels of 
transfer. Guatemalan highland households are studies using this model.  
xxii Cheryl Doss (1996) also discusses the testing problem among various household models. She 
summarizes a list of null hypotheses that are expected to be either consistent or rejected under those models 
[Table 1, p. 1602]. Based on the cross-tabulation, theoretically collective models and cooperative models 
are not differentiable, whereas these two should be distinguishable from non-cooperative models. 
xxiii One example of extending intra-household models beyond marriage is McElroy (1997). The study 
explores a general equilibrium of bargaining and marriage markets. 
xxiv The targeting literature studies the design of tax and transfer programs for poverty alleviation in the 
presence of limited information on who the poor are (Haddad & Kanbur, 1991).  
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